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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.
Nature of the Case
This Appeal concerns the issue of timeliness of the service of the Notice of Appeal
submitted to the Idaho Industrial Commission, appealing that decision of the Idaho
Department of Labor wherein the Hearing Examiner had ruled Appellant was responsible
for a civil penalty for an untimely filed quarterly tax report. The merits of the decision of
that appeal's examiner is not at issue here, and will not be addressed in this appeal, as the
only issue for now is whether or not the appeal to the Industrial Commission was timely
processed, pursuant to §72-1368 (5)(6), Idaho Code.

II.
Course of Proceedings Below
On May 15, 2008, Appellant served his Notice of Appeal of the May 1, 2008
decision of the Department of Labor rendered by Hearing Officer, Janet C. Hardy. See
Agency Record, pp. 9, 12, 13, 25, 26. That Notice of Appeal was served by U.S. mail and
also by facsimile service, each perfected on May 15, 2008 between 5:22 p.m. and 5:35 p.m.
The Notice of Appeal, as submitted by U.S. mail, was mailed and postmarked by the use of
a postage meter franking mechanism on May 15, 2008, See Agency Record, p. 13, and
delivered to the U.S. Postal Service Distribution Center on Cole Road in Ada County, Idaho
at 5:35 p.m. (See affidavit of John M. Gibson, Agency Record, pp. 25-26). At the
approximate same time, the Notice of Appeal was also faxed by facsimile transmission on
May 15, 2008 at the approximate hour of5:22 p.m., See Agency Record, p. 25.
The Notice of Filing of Appeal however, was entered by the Industrial Commission
as being served on May 20, 2008 (mail), See Agency Record, p. 10. On May 21, 2008, a

Notice of Appearance was filed by the Office of the Attorney General, and filed with the
Industrial Commission on May 21, 2008.
On May 27, 2008, believing the appeal was being processed, Appellant filed a
request for a Briefmg Schedule with the Industrial Commission, See Agency Record, pp. 1718. Toe Industrial Commission instead prepared and issued an order dismissing the appeal
on or about June 5, 2008, See Agency Record, pp. 19-21. The order dismissing the appeal
addressed only the service through facsimile process, and did not address the fact the Notice
of Appeal was also served upon the Industrial Commission through the U.S. mail, postage
prepaid and postmarked with a postage meter franking insignia and delivered to the U.S.
Postal Service Distribution Center on May 15, 2008.
Recognizing the failure of the Industrial Commission to review the perfected service
by mail on May 15, 2008, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25, 2008,
See Agency Record, pp. 22-23, and in support of that Motion for Reconsideration, did file

the affidavit of John M. Gibson, therein speaking to those relevant factors at issue, See
Agency Record, pp. 24-27. On July 25, 2008, the Industrial Commission entered an order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, therein suggesting "the date on a private postage
meter can be readily changed to any date by the user, and therefore lacks the inherent
reliability of the official U.S. postmark", and of interest, chose to find no relevance to the
fact the Notice of Appeal was also faxed within the immediate process and time frame
sequence as was the Notice of Appeal being mailed and postmarked the same day, and
delivered to the U.S. mail, by John M. Gibson, upon his departure from the Law Office, and
arrived at the U.S. Postal Distribution Center at approximately 5:35 p.m., May 15, 2008, as
identified in his affidavit, See Agency Record, p. 26.

As a result of that denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, this appeal was taken
from each of the two orders entered by the Idaho Industrial Commission, to the Supreme
Court of the State ofldaho, filed September 4, 2008.
III.
Statement of Facts
On May 1, 2008, a decision was rendered by hearing officer, Janet C. Hardy, an
appeals' examiner with the Idaho Department of Labor, assessing a civil penalty for filing of
a quarterly tax report claimed to be untimely by the Department of Labor. From that
decision, a Notice of Appeal was generated and served upon the Industrial Commission on
May 15, 2008, See Agency Record, pp.9, 12, 13, 14, 24-27. The Notice of Appeal was
processed and served through both the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, with the use of a Pitney
Bowes postage meter franking machine, and hand delivered to the U.S. Postal Distribution
Center located at Cole Road, Boise, Idaho, at 5:35 p.m., as well as it being faxed to the
Industrial Commission through facsimile service at approximately 5:22 p.m. on May 15,
2008. The physical process by which the Notice of Appeal was prepared, mailed, and faxed
to the Idaho Industrial Commission on May 15, 2008, is identified in detail in the affidavit
of John M. Gibson, office manager of the Law Offices of Vernon K. Smith, who had been
actively engaged in that position as an office manager since 2002, See affidavit, Agency
Record pp. 24-27. As Mr. Gibson so described, on May 15, 2008, at approximately 4:00
p.m., he did participate in the process of the preparation and generation of the Notice of
Appeal, and was directly engaged in completing the service process of that Notice of
Appeal, having participated in the performance of the service requirements established by
Rule 2D, Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure. In his clerical capacity, Mr. Gibson
did complete the final computer preparation of the Notice of Appeal, and did then cause the

document to be printed on Appellant's gold embossed letterhead stationary as utilized when
corresponding with other counsel, state agencies, and the courts, and following that printing
process, the final draft of the Notice of Appeal was then signed by Appellant, and Mr.
Gibson then made a copy of the original document printed on the gold embossed letterhead,
and did then proceed to prepare a facsimile cover sheet, and did then proceed to fax the copy
of the Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Industrial Commission at the telephone number 3342321, and Mr. Gibson did verify the facsimile transmission was then completed and a
successful transmission. In that process, he then forthwith proceeded to prepare an envelope
which he addressed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, and did then place the original
Notice of Appeal in that envelope, and did then seal that envelope, and thereupon Mr.
Gibson did then cause to be affixed to that envelope, the first class postage prepaid as
required on U.S. mailing documents, using the Pitney Bowes postage meter franking
machine maintained in the Law Office which did thereupon print the postage on the
envelope with sufficient clarity and conformity of its postmark for the U.S. postal service,
and by approximately 5:35 p.m. on May 15, 2008, Mr. Gibson did deliver that envelope
packet to the Distribution Center for the U.S. postal service, located on South Cole Road,
Boise, Ada County, Idaho, en route on his way home to his residence.
Notwithstanding the completed process of service, following Appellant's request for
a briefing schedule, See Agency Record, pp. 17-18, filed May 27, 2008, the Industrial
Commission entered an order dismissing the appeal on June 5, 2008, See Agency Record,
pp. 19-21, therein directing concern the Notice of Appeal was served by fax, See Agency
Record, p. 20, and indicated that the timestamp on the face of the appeal document reflected
it was transmitted to the Industrial Commission at 5:22 p.m. on May 15, 2008, and received
by the commission at 5:32 p.m. on May 15, 2008, and therefore the notice by fax was

received by the commission after 5:00 pm., and must be deemed to have been filed on May
16, 2008, one day after the expiration of the time allowed to file an appeal. The Industrial
commission did not mention the service of the Notice of Appeal as perfected by U.S. mail,
and because of that disregard, Appellant did file a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25,
2008, See Agency Record, pp.22-23, and supported that motion by the affidavit of John M.
Gibson See Agency Record, pp.24-27, therein addressing in detail the procedure by which
the Notice of Appeal was computer generated, and service was made by both facsimile and
U.S. mail postage prepaid with the postage meter franking process on May 15, 2008.
The Industrial Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration, and took the position
"the date on private postage meters can be readily changed to any date by the user and
therefore they lacked the inherent reliability of the official U.S. postmark". The Industrial
Commission chose to disregard what is regarded as the official postage meter mark that had
been affixed to the envelope within minutes of the facsimile transmission of the copy of the
Notice, and ignored the fact service by fax and mail were made within minutes of each
other, with mailing complete by the franking process, and with delivery at the U.S. Postal
Distribution Center on South Cole Road located in Boise, Ada County, Idaho, as identified
in the affidavit of John M. Gibson. The Industrial Commission instead chose to rely upon
on what appears to be a mark or "postmark" apparently contained on the back or reverse
side of the envelope, See Agency Record, p. 14, being a small circle with lines which
appears to contain the inscription of a mark placed there from a location identified as
Watsontown, Pennsylvania, with a date indicated within the circle to be May 20, 2008, at
5:00 p.m. Where such a mark came from on the reverse side of the envelope is both
mystical and quite interesting, as the letter was being sent to Boise, Idaho, not Watsontown,
PA. The postage meter franking "postmarks" are official, and are placed on the front side of

the envelope, just as this one was placed there by the postal machine, and constitutes the
postmark as authorized and recognized by the U.S. postal service. The Industrial
Commission apparently thought Appellant should explain such an oddity why a letter
delivered to the U.S. postal service for mailing to the Idaho Industrial Commission at 317
W. Main Street, 2nd floor, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho, 83720, with a postage meter
prepaid franking postmark is somehow found at or has ended up in Watsontown, PA.
Appellant would not venture a guess, but one could sunnise it was a postal error. The U.S.
postal service would likely say their sorting, routing, and distribution process at times will
make mistakes, and mail is distributed in error in their separation, keying, and routing
process, but Appellant could not be expected to explain away what the U.S. postal service
does with mail in their custody, but make no mistake, the postage meter mail insignia i§ the
official and recognized postmark for such mailings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On an appeal from an agency's decision under the IAPA, this Appellate Court
reviews the agency record independently of any other decision. See Sagewillow, Inc. v.
Idaho Department a/Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831,836, 70 P.3d 667,674 (2003); Brett
v. Eleventh Street Dockowner 's Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 517, 112 P.3d 805 (2005); Willig v. State
Dep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995); Boise Group
Homes, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 908, 909, 854 P.2d 251, 252

0993); Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 61, 83 I P.2d 527, 529 (1992).
The Court's role is to review the matter to ensure compliance with the applicable
standards. If these standards are not met, the agency action" ... shall be set aside, in whole
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary" in accordance _with the

he

Court's discretion. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3); See also Sagewillow, Inc., 138 Idaho at 836,
70 P.3d at 674; See Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner 's Ass 'n, supra.
The Idaho Industrial Commission is an agency subject to review and subsequent
appellate review. See for example, Peterson v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 938 P.2d
1214 (1997); § 67-5201 (2), Idaho Code.
Judicial review is confined to the record, and the reviewing court does not substitute
its judgment for that of the administrative agency on questions of fact. Boise Group Homes,
123 Idaho at 909, 854 P.2d at 252; Dovel, 122 Idaho at 61, 831 P.2d at 529; Morgan v.
Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 8-9, 813 P.2d 345, 347-48 (1991); Brett v.
Eleventh Street Dockowner 's Ass 'n, supra.

Findings of fact must be based upon substantial evidence, not conjecture,
speculation or matters not in the Record (See § 67-5279 (3)(d)) and cannot be based on any
arbitrary or capricious belief, or the result of an abuse of discretion. See § 67-5279 (3)(e),
Idaho Code.

The Administrative Code, as established in Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code, does
provide for an aggrieved person to seek judicial review and a right of appeal of any act,
order or proceeding ofan agency. See§ 67-5270, Idaho Code.

The reviewing court may reverse or modify the agency act or decision if substantial
rights of the parties have been prejudiced by administrative findings which violate
constitutional or statutory provisions, or are in excess of authority, or made upon unlawful
procedure, or are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or capricious. See Greenfield Village Apts. v.
Ada County, 130 Idaho 207, 938 P.2d 1245 0997); Idaho County v. Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare, 128 Idaho 846, 920 P.2d 62 0996); Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v.
State Board of Land Com 'rs, 128 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 0996); Skyview - Hazeldel, ·

Inc., v Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 128 Idaho 756, 918 P.2d 1201 (1996); §
67-5279 (4), Idaho Code.
If the Court cannot find substantial evidentiary support for the administrative
agency's decision, the Court must reverse the decision or remand the case for further
proceedings necessary to establish or complete a record. See generally Greenfield Village

Apts. v. Ada County, supra.
The Court exercises free review over all questions of law and any legal conclusions
reached by the agency. See Qualman v. State Department of Employment, 129 Idaho 92,
922 P.2d 389 (1996); Crooks v. Inland 465 Ltd Partnership, 129 Idaho 43, 921 P.2d 743
(1996).
Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal. See

Peterson v. Franklin County, supra; Love v. Board ofCounty Comm 'rs ofBingham County,
105 Idaho 558,671 P.2d 417 0983); Von Jones v. Board ofCounty Com 'rs, Cassia County,
129 Idaho 683 931 P.2d 1201 0997): Greenfield Village Apts. v. Ada County, supra.
A decision cannot rest on speculation or conjecture. Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho
647,652,448 P.2d 653,658 0968); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46,844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct.
App. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
WHETHER THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS TIMELY SERVED
UPON THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PURSUANT
TO §72-1368 (5)(6), IDAHO CODE.

II.
WHETHER APPELLANT IS ENTITELD TO RECOVER
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.

no

ARGUMENT
I.
WHETHER THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS TIMELY SERVED
UPON THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PURSUANT
TO §72-1368 (5)(6), IDAHO CODE.
Section 72-1368 (5)(6), Idaho Code does therein provide that a decision of an
examiner issued by the Idaho Department of Labor shall become final 14 days after service
of the notice of the decision, unless within that time, a claim for review (appeal) is filed with
the Industrial Commission. In this case, the examiner's decision was received by mail on
May 1, 2008, thereby requiring notice for review or appeal to be filed with the Industrial
Commission no later than May 15, 2008. That same statutory provision provides notice for
review or appeal is served when mailed to a party at its last known address, and that service
by mail is deemed complete on the date of mailing. There should be no dispute in this case.
Service by both fax and mail was completed by facsimile service at 5:22 p.m. and by
mailing at 5:35 p.m. on May 15, 2008. The facsimile service, though deemed received after
5:00 p.m. on May 15, 2008, is nonetheless most relevant to confinn the sequence and a
process in which the Notice of Appeal was computer generated, a copy faxed, the original
mailed by placing it in an envelope, affixing a postage meter franking insignia postmark on
it, and delivering it to the U.S. Postal Service Distribution Center for delivery to the
Industrial Commission. The facsimile service has been identified in the Record to have
been transmitted at 5:22 p.m. on May 15, 2008, and as that facsimile process is underway,
the original or "hard copy" of the Notice of Appeal is being inserted in an envelope, and
postage by meter mail is being affixed to the envelope within minutes of the facsimile
transmission, and in less than 17 minutes from the moment the fax is transmitted, Mr.

nn

Gibson has delivered the envelope containing the Notice of Appeal, and "postmarked" with
the Pitney Bowes postage meter franking insignia affixed thereto, to the U.S. Postal
Distribution Center on South Cole Road, and completed at approximately 5:35 p.m. on May
15, 2008. The significance of that sequence and composite of events in that this procedure
adds credibility, reliability, and assurance to the fact the envelope was postage meter
postmarked was deemed mailed and was actually delivered to the U.S. postal service, just
like the envelope shows, (See Agency record, p. 13), which states by the postmark the
envelope was mailed from zip code 83702". This mailing is deemed complete on the date of
that mailing, as the placement of the postmark with a postage meter mail process is a U.S.
mailing, and different from the mere act of placing one or two stamps on an envelope that
need to be cancelled. This issue of reliability and credibility of the meter mail process by
the Industrial commission is a red herring, but not withstanding, appears to be the issue in
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, as the Industrial Commission has suggested
you can change the date on the meter, and that makes it unreliable. If that be possible, or
not, that is not the issue. The fact remains the meter mail date is a "postmark" authorized by
the postal service, and it is U.S. mail when marked as such, and the Industrial Commission
is not viewing the issue correctly when arguing a date on a private postage meter can be
readily changed by the user, and therefore lacks the inherent reliability of the "official U.S.
postmark". Getting off track, they then chose instead to focus on a Pennsylvania circle mark
on the reverse side of the envelope showing May 20, 2008. In the same breath, however, the
Commission did recognize the envelope did contain Appellant's Notice of Appeal, and it did
bear a timely postage meter postmark of May 15, 2008, referred to by it as a private postage
meter "stamp", but instead ignored the "postmark" it represents and actually constitutes, and
chose to rely upon a circle mark on the back side of the envelope showing the date of May

n rn

20, 2008, suggesting that is the date of mailing, or the date on which the U.S. postal service
"took custody of claimant's protest for the express purpose of delivering it to the
commission.", See Agency Record, p. 28. That would be illogical, and with all due respect
to the Industrial Commission, the disregard of the official meter mail postmark, and then the
suggestion of a "postmark" reflecting a date of May 20, 2008, is contrary to the date of May
15, reflected on the envelope as the postmark. It would appear Pennsylvania is a location
where the envelope had passed, and it appears to be Watsontown, PA. where the marking
was affrxed on it on or about May 20, 2008. Is Idaho Industrial Commission suggesting that
"claimant" (Appellant herein) went to Watsontown, Pa. on May 20, 2008, and after
traveling 2,301.58 miles, would hand deliver the envelope containing the Notice of Appeal
to the U.S. postal service for the first time, in Watsontown, and that the U.S. postal service
only then "took custody of claimant's protest for the express purpose of delivering it to the
commission"? Not only is that an illogical conclusion, but additionally does arbitrarily
ignore the "postmark" officially recognized with metered mail, and there is nothing in this
record to suggest the U.S. postal service "took custody of claimant's protest" for the first
time on May 20, 2008 in Watsontown, Pa; the record would suggest that the Notice and the
envelope in which it was contained got to Watsontown while in custody and possession of
the U.S. postal service. There is a clear showing in the Record Appellant's Notice of
Appeal was contained in an envelope that was "postmarked" by a postage meter franking
meter machine on May 15, 2008, stating thereon it was "mailed from zip code 83702" on
that date, and it was delivered to the U.S. Postal Service Distribution Center by 5:35 p.m., as
confinned by the affidavit of Mr. Gibson. Clearly, the U.S. postal service had it in their
hands at the Distribution Center of the U.S. postal service on South Cole Road in Boise, Ada
County, Idaho, and they artfully delivered it to Pennsylvania in some manner of a routing

confusion. The most probable event is that in their sorting or distribution process there was
a glitch at the postal service, and Appellant's Notice of Appeal must have become
improperly sorted, or routed, or distributed into an erroneous keyed or distribution grouping,
but none-the-less at all times was in the custody and possession of the U.S. postal service,
and as they say, it was "in the mail" on May 15, 2008, as confirmed on the authorized
postmark, and that postmark is the date deemed for mailing purposes. The front side of the
envelope is where mail is processed and not the back side of the envelope, and if the back
side does contain a mark placed there from Watsontown, Pa., it would merely be a
recognition it was at a point in time delivered there, and was then redistributed back to the
State ofldaho.
The Industrial Commission has sought to rely heavily upon the case of In Re
Dominy, 116 Idaho 727, 779 P. 2d, 402 (1989). That court held to the effect, the timeliness

of an appeal in these department of labor matters is determined by the "postmark" on the
mailing, as established in the matter of the Department ofEmployment v. Drinkard, 98
Idaho 222, 560 P. 2d, 1312 (1977).
In Drinkard, the Court held that under a predecessor of Rule 06.012 the timeliness of
an appeal was determined by the postmark on the request. The rule that was at issue in
Drinkard stated that "the request for hearing shall be deemed filed on the date of mailing to
[the] local office or the Boise office of the Appeals Examiner, as determined by the
postmark on said request." Id at 225, 560 P. 2d at 1315.
In the case of In Re Dominy, 116 Idaho 727, 779 P. 2d, 402 (1989), the Notice of
Appeal was placed in the envelope, and the appropriate amount of stamps were affJXed to
the letter, and the letter was then placed in the "office mail", which was delivered to the
Weiser, Idaho post office on the same day. The postmaster stated the letter was deposited in
the Weiser post office and it would then be routed to Boise where it would then be
"stamped" as received there, and would then be forwarded on to the appropriate address.

Consequently, the "stamped" process would constitute the postmark for the proof as to the
date of mailing. The only "stamping" on a postage meter franking process is the postmark
created by the postage meter marking, which~ the "postmark", as confrrmed by the U.S.
postal service, should the Industrial Commission elect someday to ask. This "postmark" is
placed there by the postage meter, and the "postmark" process is complete and that event is
deemed mailed. In fact, the meter mail process has contained in its stamp the wording
inscribed "mailed from zip code 83702", See envelope, Agency Record, p. 13. The meter
mail is different than the mere placement of stamps on an envelope. It constitutes a
postmark authorized by the U.S. postal service for placement on the envelope, and is
deemed the mailing date upon placement there, consistent with the postmark controlling the
date of mailing in Drinkard, supra. When the Distribution Center receives it, the postmark is
recognized and processed through the sorting process as "metered mail", and is slated for
distribution by the U.S. postal service. It is not further postmarked. As noted in the Dominy
case, the Weiser post office mail is routed to Boise to go through the Distribution Center on
Cole Road, where the stamp or postmark is placed, and the process for delivery is begun.
Clearly, Appellant's Notice of Appeal was "mailed" on May 15, 2008, and delivered to the
custody and possession of the U.S. postal service at the Distribution Center, to assume
speedy processing, and for purposed of labor review matters, it is nonetheless "in the mail"
on May 15, 2008, as the postage meter franking process is the "postmark" used on metered
mail, and is time sensitive and is processed in accordance with that postage meter mark date
on it, as it becomes a postmark that is then processed by that recognition in the U.S. postal
service as "metered mail", and not treated as requiring any additional posting or marking.
For the Industrial Commission to disregard the postage meter franking mark, and to
ignore the meter mail processing, and to say it has no signs of a postal postmark, despite the

signs of metered mail processing, and despite the fact it was placed in the hands of the U.S.
postal service at the distribution center in Boise, where it could only logically be from there
where it was apparently routed to Pennsylvania for reasons truly unknown, and to then
embrace the idea that a "postmark" on the reverse side instead is what it would choose to
characterize the circle to be what it will recognize as the date of mailing, relying on a mark
placed there on the back side of the envelope from a Pennsylvania mail station is viewed as
being somewhat cavalier and absolutely arbitrary. To suggest that mark on the backside is
now the "postmark", and that mark constitutes the date of mailing and date of service of the
Notice of Appeal to be May 20, 2008, instead of the postage meter authorized postmark date
of May 15, 2008, is contrary to the state of the meter mailing process, and only serves to
stretch the imagination and bewilderment of what constitutes the reasonable bounds of the
Commission's discretion or awareness of mailing mandates. How the Idaho Industrial
Commission could seriously think the postal station in Watsontown, PA., is the "postmark",
and that postal station in Pennsylvania received this piece of mail from Appellant for
delivery through the U.S. postal service, and from there it would get to Idaho and into the
hands of the Idaho Industrial Commission is about as capricious as it comes. The U.S.
postal service had continuous custody of that piece of mail since May 15, 2008 at 5:35 p.m.
The Industrial Commission would choose to give no credence to the postal meter process,
yet doesn't attempt to discuss the fact the postal service had to have the letter in order to get

it over to Pennsylvania, and then for it to come back to Idaho, and did all that with the
processed meter mailing of May 15, 2008, as the postage meter postmark authorized for
placement on envelopes for postmark purposes, with the postage prepaid when the postage
meter mailing process is used by Appellant in his Law Office, and those postage meter
franking insignias, once placed on an envelope; are intended to constitute what it says:

"mailed from zip code 83702" on that date, and on deposit with the U.S. mail, which was
delivered to the postal service on that day, confirmed by the affidavit of John M. Gibson,
where he precisely explained the procedure how he affixed the postage meter franking
postmark insignia to the envelope and delivered it to the U.S. mail, constituting conclusive
proof of mailing, despite the fact the postmark is the recognized prepaid meter date of
mailing, and must be deemed as such under Idaho Law. Meter mail is far different from just
placing stamps on an envelope, as in the In Re Dominy case. Unfortunately, in that case,
there was no form of dating established until a postal stamp was affixed at the Distribution
Center some 13 days later. The dissents in the case demonstrate the apparent unfairness of
that outcome, but the "postmark" theory remains the controlling law, and metered mail is
the postmark. The decision of the Industrial Commission, with the discretionary entry of an
order dismissing the appeal of Appellant on June 5, 2008, See Agency Record, pp. 19-21,
and the order denying Motion for Reconsideration, See Agency Record, pp. 28-30, with its
discretionary denial, constitutes an abuse of discretion in declaring the Appeal Notice
untimely, and the attempt to declare the Watsontown, Pa. mark on the reverse side of the
envelope to constitute a controlling "postmark" on this envelope, for "mailing" pmposes is
capricious, as the envelope on the front side contains a lawfully franked postage meter
postmark insignia, as authorized for placement and delivery in the U.S. postal service on
May 15, 2008, and is deemed "mailed from zip code 83702", as the meter mark declares.
II.
WHETHER APPELLANT IS ENTITELD TO RECOVER
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.

When administrative findings are made without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and
violate constitutional or statutory provisions, or in excess of authority or were made upon

unlawful procedure, or were clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious, attorney fees and
costs are allowed to be awarded pursuant to §12-117, Idaho Code. See Roeder Holdings,
L.L.C. v. Ada County, 136 Idaho 809, 41 P. 3d 237 (2001).

Section 12-117, Idaho Code, provides for attorney fees to a person, in any
administrative or civil judicial proceeding, involving adverse parties with a state agency, a
city, a county or other taxing district. That statute allows for an award of reasonable attorney
fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses to the party, if the court finds in favor of the
person, and fmds that the agency, city or county has acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law.
Appellant would respectfully claim a right to recover all such fees and costs
incurred in this appeal, as the Order of Dismissal in this case and the denial of the Motion to
Reconsider was pursued and granted without a basis in fact or law, would appear to be
contrary to the mailing process, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The Order of Dismissal and denial of the Motion for Reconsideration should be set
aside and be reversed, and the matter remanded with instructions to process the appeal as
timely submitted.

Dated this 21 st day of January 2009.
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